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29 result(s) for “trust law site lemma world site:arxiv.org” of 59 matched · page 2 · 410 ms

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Effort-Centric Fairness in Lending Decisions

https://arxiv.org/html/2607.28847v1
2 Proof of Lemma 1 (Optimality of Boundary Crossing) D

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https://arxiv.org/html/2608.02942v1
org perpetual non-exclusive license arXiv:2608

Asymptotic Equivalence of Immediate and Deferred Acceptance

https://arxiv.org/html/2607.24970v2
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Microstructural Foundations of Rough Noise1footnote

https://arxiv.org/html/2607.29442v2
1footnoteFootnotefootnotesFootnotes1footnote 1We are grateful to Carsten Chong for fruitful discussions on rough noise. We benefitted from comments by and discussions with Kim Christensen, Mikko Pakkanen, Bent Jesper Christensen, and Mikkel

Activation-Guided Neuron Intervention to Induce Alzheimer’s-Related

https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03067v1
Computational Language Phenotypes in a Large Language Model Report GitHub Issue × Title: Content selection saved. Describe the issue below: Description: Submit without GitHub Submit in GitHub arXiv is now an independent nonprofit!

Raising Rivals’ Costs on Hybrid Platforms: The Complementarity of Fees

https://arxiv.org/html/2608.02800v1
and Self-Preferencing Report GitHub Issue × Title: Content selection saved. Describe the issue below: Description: Submit without GitHub Submit in GitHub arXiv is now an independent nonprofit! Learn more × Back to arXiv Why HTML?

1. Introduction

https://arxiv.org/html/2608.02909v1
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Learning to Control Unknown Strongly Monotone Games

https://arxiv.org/html/2407.00575v3
1 Introduction 1.1 Related Work 1.2 Outline and Notation 2 Problem Formulation 2.1 Applications 2.1.1 Quadratic Global Objective 2.1.2 Weighted Resource Allocation Games 3 Game Control Algorithm 3.1 Performance Guarantees 4 Convergence

Existence of Richter–Peleg representation for general preferences

https://arxiv.org/html/2508.08980v3
org perpetual non-exclusive license arXiv:2508

United We Stand: Decentralized Multi-Agent Planning With Attrition

https://arxiv.org/html/2407.08254v2
1 Introduction 2 Related Work 3 Problem Formulation 3.1 Multi-agent planning with attrition 4 Attritable MCTS with Regret Minimization 4.1 Overview of the A-MCTS algorithm 4.2 Regret Matching For Cooperative Coordination 4.3 Analysis and

Stochastic Choice with Advertising

https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03504v1
org perpetual non-exclusive license arXiv:2608

Learning Equilibrium with Estimated Payoffs in Population Games

https://arxiv.org/html/2407.06328v2
I Introduction II Preliminaries and Problem Description II-A Task Allocation Game Model II-B Learning Rule, Stochastic Alarm Clock, and Evolutionary Dynamics Model II-C Payoff Vector Estimation III Convergence Analysis and Revision Rate

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https://arxiv.org/html/2608.00426v1
org perpetual non-exclusive license arXiv:2608

You’ve Got to be Efficient: Ambiguity, Misspecification and

https://arxiv.org/html/2604.05327v4
Variational Preferences Report GitHub Issue × Title: Content selection saved. Describe the issue below: Description: Submit without GitHub Submit in GitHub arXiv is now an independent nonprofit! Learn more × Back to arXiv Why HTML?

SFT Conflicts, RL Coexists: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of

https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03573v1
org perpetual non-exclusive license arXiv:2608

Forthcoming in SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics Decentralised

https://arxiv.org/html/2309.08431v3
Finance and Automated Market Making: Predictable Loss and Optimal Liquidity Provision 1 Introduction 2 Constant function markets and concentrated liquidity 2.1 Constant function markets 2.2 Concentrated liquidity markets 3 The wealth of

Eliminating Majority Illusion is Easy

https://arxiv.org/html/2407.20187v1
1 Introduction 1.1 The Illusion Elimination Problem 1.2 Our Contributions. 1.3 Related Work. 2 Preliminaries 3 Majority Illusion Addition Elimination (MIAE) 3.1 A First Attempt 3.2 A Second Attempt 3.3 A TDI System 3.4 A Polynomial Time

1 Introduction

https://arxiv.org/html/2511.06451v1
1 Data Protocol (arXiv Release) Synthetic risk–neutral generator

Maximizing utility in multi-agent environments by anticipating the

https://arxiv.org/html/2407.04889v1
behavior of other learners 1 Introduction Setting. Zero-sum games. General-sum games. 1.1 Preliminaries 1.2 Algorithms for the learner 1.3 Our results 1.3.1 Zero sum games Continuous-time games. Discrete-time games. 1.3.2 A lower bound

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https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.12628
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Stochastic Games with Minimally Bounded Action Costs

https://arxiv.org/html/2407.18010v2
1 Introduction 2 Formulation 3 Existence of a Value and Saddle Point Equilibrium 4 Learning in Unknown Environments 4.1 Convergence using Linear Function Approximators 5 Intervention Budget Constraints 6 Discussion on Subcases 7 Related

Preying on Leveraged ETFsPreliminary and incomplete. This project was

https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03703v1
begun on July 20, 2026; the present version is dated August 4, 2026. Claude Opus 5 and Fable 5 provided research assistance throughout, spanning code development, data construction and empirical analysis, and the drafting of the manuscript.

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https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.02318
org/pdfua/ns/id/ pdfuaid PDF/UA ID Schema internal Part of PDF/UA standard part Integer PRISM metadata http://prismstandard

Homogeneous Distributed Observers for Quasilinear Systems

https://arxiv.org/html/2407.05763v1
1 Introduction 2 Preliminaries 2.1 Graph Theory 2.2 Generalized Homogeneity 3 Problem Statement 4 Basic Idea of the Observer Design 5 Homogeneous Observer Design 5.1 Globally Homogeneous Distributed Observer 5.2 Locally Homogeneous

Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.24888
--> Computer Science > Cryptography and Security arXiv:2607

[1805.04163v2] Hyper-Kamiokande Design Report

https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.04163v2
The experiment will be the largest underground water Cherenkov detector in the world and will be instrumented with new technology photosensors, faster and with higher quantum efficiency than the ones in Super-Kamiokande

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https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03372v1
org  GitHub sourcecontextcandidatememoryalign claimscontent-word overlapseven checkspolarity ⋅\cdot condition ⋅\cdot temporalhedge ⋅\cdot attributionbrittle ⋅\cdot truncatedflagsevidence + citationverdict policyhard-codedpasspass_w_flagsrewriterejectuncheckablenever a passwitness (optional)one sentence, one

[2006.03994] A Scalable Architecture for Monitoring IoT Devices Using

https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.03994
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Signal Processing

https://arxiv.org/list/eess.SP/new
all New submissions (showing 14 of 14 entries) [1] arXiv:2608