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30 result(s) for “if cram mojeek site lemma dbzer0 com site:arxiv.org” of 94 matched · 325 ms
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Did you mean if cam mojeek site lemmy dbzer0 com site:arxiv.org?
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https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03452v1
Probing five architectures, twelve trained models each, under lemma-disjoint cross-validation with controls and surface baselines, we show that the models encode the L-shaped class itself, not just its visible alternations
https://arxiv.org/html/2205.01882v5
2 Details of the DVD Dataset
M Additional Empirical Application: Fishing-site Choice
M
https://arxiv.org/html/2607.22511v2
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https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03504v1
org perpetual non-exclusive license
arXiv:2608
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.02318
org/pdfua/ns/id/ pdfuaid PDF/UA ID Schema internal Part of PDF/UA standard part Integer PRISM metadata http://prismstandard
https://arxiv.org/html/2403.16413v3
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arXiv:2403
https://arxiv.org/html/2407.00419v1
W say that a population of adaptive agents is socially intelligent if its members are (1) individually Hannan-consistent and (2) compatible in the sense that any pair of agents will perform nearly as well as some Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium of the matrix game
https://arxiv.org/list/cs.DS/new
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New submissions (showing 7 of 7 entries)
[1] arXiv:2608
https://arxiv.org/list/cs.LG/2022-12
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[1] arXiv:2212
https://arxiv.org/html/2608.02609v1
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https://arxiv.org/html/2607.24970v2
That total number of applications mirrors the classical coupon-collector problem: if each breakfast cereal box contains one of nn equally likely coupons, how many cereal boxes do I need to buy to collect all nn coupons
https://arxiv.org/html/2508.20108v2
Normalization for Accurate Prediction
1 Introduction
2 Related Works
2.1 Geometric Brownian Motion
2.2 Deep Learning-Based Stock Price Prediction
2.3 Methods for Addressing Distribution Shift
3 Proposed Method
3.1 Overview
3.2 Return
https://arxiv.org/html/2407.10811v1
II RELATED WORK
II-A Traditional methods
II-B RL methods.
III PRELIMINARIES
IV METHOD
IV-A RL Setup
IV-B Network design
IV-C Training
IV-D Theoretical Analysis
V EXPERIMENT
V-A Towards Real-world Dataset and Simulation
V-B Benchmark
https://arxiv.org/html/2608.02909v1
In practice, most researchers use the generated variables “as is” on the right-hand side of the regression, as if they captured the true, latent variable of interest
https://arxiv.org/html/2608.02800v1
com in China, Walmart Marketplace and Target Plus in the United States, Otto in Germany, Flipkart in India, and Rakuten in Japan
https://arxiv.org/html/2607.26405v1
& Optimal Design
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New submissions (showing 32 of 32 entries)
[1] arXiv:2608
https://arxiv.org/html/2407.00575v3
Even worse, the manager would need to collect the parameters periodically if they are time-varying, and then solve the large-scale optimization problem again
https://arxiv.org/html/2508.08980v3
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arXiv:2508
https://arxiv.org/html/2407.08254v2
We prove that our approach guarantees that the average joint action of all agents converges to a Nash equilibrium (NE) if every agent applies the same RM procedure in any cooperative game with a submodular utility function
https://arxiv.org/html/2407.06328v2
In such dynamic game settings, if agents have limited capabilities for observing the game’s state, they must estimate it and use this estimate to infer expected payoffs and select one of available strategies
https://arxiv.org/html/2604.05327v4
For these problems, it is therefore always optimal for the decision-maker to proceed as if the likelihood were correctly specified and select the resulting optimal decision rule
https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03573v1
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arXiv:2608
https://arxiv.org/html/2412.12213v2
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https://arxiv.org/html/2608.02943v1
org perpetual non-exclusive license
arXiv:2608
https://arxiv.org/html/2407.20187v1
If there are more blue nodes than red nodes then we say blue is the majority
https://arxiv.org/html/2309.08431v3
Concentration risk refers to the decrease in fee revenue if the marginal exchange rate (akin to the midprice in a limit order book) in the pool exits the LP’s range of liquidity
https://arxiv.org/html/2511.06451v1
1 Data Protocol (arXiv Release)
Synthetic risk–neutral generator
https://arxiv.org/list/cond-mat/new
The mixed anomaly between these is accommodated by the not-on-site action of the symmetries
https://arxiv.org/html/2407.04889v1
Therefore, if an agent is good at anticipating the behavior of the other agents, in particular how they will make decisions in each round as a function of their experience that far, it could try to judiciously make its own decisions over the rounds of the interaction so as to influence the other agents to behave in a