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The second scenario suggests that the conceptual framework provided by neurosciences (or some other physical account) can or should come to replace the common-sense framework we now use
from the top result below

Eliminative Materialism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2003

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/materialism-eliminative/
The second scenario suggests that the conceptual framework provided by neurosciences (or some other physical account) can or should come to replace the common-sense framework we now use

Catharine Trotter Cockburn (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/cockburn/index.html
Moral sense theory is the view that humans possess a special sensory ability that can determine, pre-rationally, what is good or evil (This view was made most famous by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson)

--> Love (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Summer 2016 Edition)

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/love/
Even within personal love, philosophers from the ancient Greeks on have traditionally distinguished three notions that can properly be called “love”: eros, agape, and philia

Stoicism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2004 Edition)

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/stoicism/
In some areas, there is a fair bit of consensus about what the Stoics thought and we can even attach names to some particular innovations

--> Structured Propositions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

https://plato.stanford.edu/ENTRIES/propositions-structured/
[1] This proposition is said to be expressed by both of the sentences uttered (taken in the contexts of utterance—to accommodate contextually sensitive expressions) by the speakers, and can be thought of as the information content of the sentences (taken in those contexts)

Descartes' Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2005

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/descartes-epistemology/
While distinguishing rigorous knowledge (scientia) and lesser grades of conviction (persuasio), Descartes writes: I distinguish the two as follows: there is conviction when there remains some reason which might lead us to doubt, but knowledge is conviction based on a reason so strong that it can never be shaken by any

Egalitarianism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2005 Edition)

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/egalitarianism/
Inequality can be measured in different ways, and no measure seems to be strongly supported by common sense intuition about the meaning of equality

Functionalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2004 Edition)

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/functionalism/
In contrast to Plato's claim that the soul can exist apart from the body, Aristotle argued (De Anima Bk

--> Russell’s Logical Atomism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/logical-atomism/
Methodologically, logical atomism can be seen as endorsement of analysis, understood as a two-step process in which one attempts to identify, for a given domain of inquiry, set of beliefs or scientific theory, the minimum and most basic concepts and vocabulary in which the other concepts and vocabulary of that domain

Rigid Designators (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2011 Edition

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/rigid-designators/
file in the archives of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Abstract Objects (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2001 Edition)

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/abstract-objects/
But Plato’s Forms were supposed to be causes par excellence, whereas abstract objects are normally supposed to be causally inert in every sense