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23 result(s) for “okapi bm25 site hotchips pp site github com site text of de site attack apache org site:arxiv.org” · 1099 ms

Scope: Nishi’s own index (our crawl + Common Crawl) — not the whole live web. Some sites block all automated crawlers (anti-bot walls), so their pages may be absent here even though we never filter lawful content.

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The query asks the model to recall the topic of an earlier conversation about Tesla; the gold answer is anchored in one specific session about Pooja’s dig site
from the top result below

Report GitHub Issue

https://arxiv.org/html/2608.02613v1
(3) Search latency bites only at very small reader: on a Spark GB10 edge node, memory-search adds a moderate and fixed 8787/77/4848 ms (BM25-RAG/Memobase/MemSearch) that composes a small part of TTFT for most reader-backend combinations

Artificial Intelligence

https://arxiv.org/list/cs.AI/new
However, their performance heavily depends on the clarity and completeness of data semantics

Report GitHub Issue

https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03048v1
To address these issues, we propose PI-Mem (Parallel-Iterative Memory), a mechanism that processes all chunks in parallel and iteratively refines a shared memory over a bounded number of turns

Computation and Language

https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CL/new
(3) Search latency bites only at very small reader: on a Spark GB10 edge node, memory-search adds a moderate and fixed 87/7/48 ms (BM25-RAG/Memobase/MemSearch) that composes a small part of TTFT for most reader-backend combinations

1 Introduction

https://arxiv.org/html/2501.13956v1
com Abstract We introduce Zep, a novel memory layer service for AI agents that outperforms the current state-of-the-art system, MemGPT, in the Deep Memory Retrieval (DMR) benchmark

1 Introduction

https://arxiv.org/html/2407.16741v3
2 Agent Runtime: How Execution of Actions Results in Observations 2

When Collaboration Becomes a Trigger:Collective Evidence-Threshold

https://arxiv.org/html/2608.01085v1
Diagnostics G Conditional View of LATTE Assumption 1 (Clean transition stability)

1 Introduction

https://arxiv.org/html/2407.02518v2
For instance, in a study of Github’s Copilot, Pearce et al

Report GitHub Issue

https://arxiv.org/html/2608.00426v1
2 Attack Potency of Memory-Link Poisoning Obs1

Software Engineering

https://arxiv.org/list/cs.SE/new
Through an analysis of 1,966 open source projects, 1,355 Github issues, 444 CVE reports, and 361 StackOverflow posts, we systematically map the feature support and real-world usage of globs across six common ecosystems that utilize globs

Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CV/new
0 achieves state-of-the-art or leading performance on text-to-3D generation and 3D editing benchmarks, while exhibiting strong understanding and part-generation capabilities

[2608.03883] DS@GT-ARC at eRisk 2026 Task 3: Sparse, Semantic, and LLM

https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03883
The task requires systems to rank candidate Reddit sentences according to their relevance to each of the 18 symptoms in the Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale (ASRS-v1

[2104.08663] BEIR: A Heterogenous Benchmark for Zero-shot Evaluation of

https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.08663
We leverage a careful selection of 18 publicly available datasets from diverse text retrieval tasks and domains and evaluate 10 state-of-the-art retrieval systems including lexical, sparse, dense, late-interaction and re-ranking architectures on the BEIR benchmark

[2608.03860] SciRet: A Compute-Aware Empirical Study of Retrieval and

https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03860
The pipeline combines sentence-window chunking, BM25, BGE-M3 dense retrieval, reciprocal rank fusion, optional cross-encoder reranking, and grounded answer generation

Single Canonical Prompts Underestimate LLM Safety’s Surface-Form

https://arxiv.org/html/2608.02665v1
9 pp, with bootstrap 95% CIs excluding zero for all five models, and 5–13% of seeds safe on canonical are unsafe under some reformulation—above a zero stochasticity floor (canonical resampled five times at temperature 0 gives 0/370 new exposures)

Report GitHub Issue

https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03210v1
Extensive experiments on three datasets and eight target foundation models demonstrate that ICO consistently outperforms eight state-of-the-art baselines, achieving an average attack success rate of 74

Information Retrieval

https://arxiv.org/list/cs.IR/recent
CL) [pdf, html, other] Title: SciRet: A Compute-Aware Empirical Study of Retrieval and Reranking for Scientific RAG Kaysarul Anas Apurba, Md

Information Retrieval

https://arxiv.org/list/cs.IR/new
We provide the core implementation of KGD at this https URL

Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.24888
24888 (cs) Title:Trusting-Trust Attack against an Entire Linux Distribution through Binary Manipulation Abstract:Ken Thompson's trusting-trust attack, in which a compromised compiler backdoors the programs it builds and reproduces the backdoor in subsequent rebuilds of itself, is widely regarded as a threat specific

Cryptography and Security Dec 2023

https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/2023-12
00006 [pdf, other] Title: Enhancing ML-Based DoS Attack Detection Through Combinatorial Fusion Analysis Evans Owusu, Mohamed Rahouti, D

Cryptography and Security

https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new
We standardize reporting using GFLOPs, accuracy loss, and an Attack Success (AS) metric that measures how much of the model's compute savings the attack takes away

Hardware Architecture

https://arxiv.org/list/cs.AR/new
Second, to highlight the importance of efficient read-disturbance management, we showcase a new possible SSD-performance attack as a case study, demonstrating that an adversary can significantly degrade the I/O performance of other concurrently running processes by exploiting read disturbance alone in commodity SSDs

Mathematics

https://arxiv.org/list/math/new
An attack on $S$ is an $|S|$-tuple of pairwise disjoint sets of attackers on vertices of $S$, whereas a defense is that of defenders