nx_hkdf.nx

hkdf.nx -- HKDF-SHA-256 (RFC 5869). HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function. Central to TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446 §7.1) key schedule: Early Secret = HKDF-Extract(0, PSK) Handshake Secret = HKDF-Extract(Derive-Secret(Early, ""), ECDHE) Master Secret = HKDF-Extract(Derive-Secret(Handshake, ""), 0) <traffic secrets> = Derive-Secret(<stage>, "<label>", transcript) Two-stage design: Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK Treats IKM as an entropy source; produces a uniformly-random pseudorandom key. Implemented as HMAC-SHA-256(salt, IKM). Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM Deterministically derives L bytes of keying material from PRK and a context string `info`. Iterates HMAC over a counter. Properties (RFC 5869 §3.3): - Deterministic: same (salt, IKM, info, L) -> same OKM. - Context-binding: different `info` -> independent OKMs. - Output limited to 255 * HashLen = 8160 bytes for SHA-256. Invariants: HK1 PRK is always exactly HashLen (32 bytes for SHA-256). HK2 Expand iterates exactly ceil(L / HashLen) times; each iteration feeds the previous output back in, creating a chain that prevents block-substitution attacks. HK3 Counter bytes are 1-indexed; wraps at 255 per RFC 5869 §2.3. We cap L at 8160 and refuse larger requests. HK4 No branches on salt/IKM/info VALUES; branches only on LENGTHS. license_tier: INDEPENDENT_REDERIVE genealogy_id: international-research-sources/ietf/rfc_5869 nx_safety_envelope: (schema: nishi-library/seeds/safety-critical-standards.toml) intended_use: "HKDF-SHA-256 key derivation -- TLS 1.3 record-protection schedule (RFC 8446 §7.1) + Noise protocol KDF + any KDF needing