code wiki / _hdl_build / nx_x509_trust_root_kat.nx
nx_x509_trust_root_kat.nx
buildroot/runtime/_hdl_build/nx_x509_trust_root_kat.nx
about
nx_x509_trust_root_kat.nx -- the RSA-verify crypto gate the ECDSA fixture couldn't provide (HONESTY SYSTEM
follow-up 2026-07-16). A self-signed ROOT's signature is over its own TBS with its own key, so it verifies
under its OWN extracted public key -- a self-contained RSA KAT needing NO chain-splitting and NO external
vector. We load the REAL Mozilla bundle (data/mozilla_certdata.txt), find real RSA-2048 (sig=256) and
RSA-4096 (sig=512) roots, and prove: extract issuer key -> self-verify -> OK ; corrupt a byte -> FAIL.
This directly exercises (with real crypto that CANNOT fake-green) all four flagged organs:
nx_x509_pubkey_extract_rsa, nx_x509_verify_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, + the _4096 pair.
license_tier: ORIGINAL expect_exit:0
dependencies 8 imports · 0 importers
imports: nx_syscalls.nxnx_x509.nxnx_x509_trust_store.nxnx_trust_store_load_from_certdata.nxnx_x509_pubkey_rsa.nxnx_x509_verify_rsa_pkcs1_sha256.nxnx_x509_pubkey_rsa_4096.nxnx_x509_verify_rsa_pkcs1_sha256_4096.nx
imported by: nobody (leaf or entry point)
call flow from main pre-order; caps 40 nodes / depth 6 declared; ↻ = already shown
structs
| none |
consts
| 21 | const ANCHOR_STRIDE: i64 = 16 // TrustAnchor = { buf:*u8, cert:*X509Cert } = two 8-byte pointers |
functions
| 18 | func kw(s: *u8) -> i64 { var n:i64=0; while s[n]!=(0 as u8){n=n+1} sys_write(1,s,n); return 0 } |
| 19 | func kn(v: i64) -> i64 { let b:*u8=sys_mmap(24); var m:i64=v; if m<0{sys_write(1,"-" as *u8,1);m=0-m} let t:*u8=sys_mmap(24); var k:i64=0; if m==0{t[0]=48 as u8;k=1} while m>0{t[k]=(48+(m%10)) as u8;m=m/10;k=k+1} var j:i64=0; while j<k{b[j]=t[k-1-j];j=j+1} sys_write(1,b,k); return 0 } |
| 23 | func main() -> i64 |