nx_connect_polls.nx source

1// nx_connect_polls.nx -- CONNECT polls + quizzes (the MED census cell; Telegram yardstick). 2// Group-scoped polls with by-construction properties: 3// - votes are MEMBER-only and IDEMPOTENT: a REVOTE REPLACES the previous choice (one voter = one 4// ballot always; the count can never inflate). NEG-CONTROL: an append-only incumbent tally 5// double-counts the same voter -- ours cannot. 6// - ANONYMOUS mode: the render carries counts ONLY; no voter identity leaves the tally (data 7// minimization at render, mirroring nx_connect_presence last-seen). 8// - CLOSE freezes results: a vote after close is refused; results are stable thereafter. 9// - QUIZ mode: the correct option is data; scores are revealed ONLY after close (no answer leak 10// to late voters). 11// 100% sovereign. license_tier: ORIGINAL expect_exit: 0 12import "nx_syscalls.nx" 13 14import "nx_connect_polls_lib.nx" 15 16func sw(s: *u8) -> i64 { var n: i64=0; while s[n]!=(0 as u8){n=n+1} sys_write(1,s,n); return 0 } 17func sn(v: i64) -> i64 { let bb: *u8=sys_mmap(28); var m: i64=v; if m<0{m=0-m;sys_write(1,"-" as *u8,1)} let t: *u8=sys_mmap(28); var k: i64=0; if m==0{t[0]=48 as u8;k=1} while m>0{t[k]=(48+(m%10)) as u8;m=m/10;k=k+1} var i: i64=0; while i<k{bb[i]=t[k-1-i];i=i+1} sys_write(1,bb,k); return 0 } 18func tcheck(pass: i64, label: *u8, fails: *i64) -> i64 { 19 sw(" " as *u8); sw(label); sw(": " as *u8) 20 if pass==1 { sw("PASS\n" as *u8) } else { sw("FAIL\n" as *u8); fails[0]=fails[0]+1 } 21 return 0 22} 23 24// ballots: parallel arrays (voter, choice). vote codes: 1 recorded, 2 revote-replaced, 25// -1 non-member, -2 poll closed, -3 bad option. 26func main() -> i64 { 27 let fails: *i64 = sys_mmap(16) as *i64 28 fails[0]=0 29 sw("=== nx_connect_polls -- polls + quizzes (idempotent revote; anonymous; close-freeze; quiz) ===\n" as *u8) 30 31 let bv: *i64 = sys_mmap(PL_MAXV*8) as *i64 32 let bc: *i64 = sys_mmap(PL_MAXV*8) as *i64 33 let nb: *i64 = sys_mmap(8) as *i64 34 nb[0]=0 35 let meta: *i64 = sys_mmap(8*8) as *i64 36 meta[0]=0 37 meta[1]=3 38 meta[2]=100 39 meta[3]=199 40 41 // T1: three members vote across options 42 let v1: i64 = pl_vote(bv, bc, nb, meta, 100, 0) 43 let v2: i64 = pl_vote(bv, bc, nb, meta, 101, 1) 44 let v3: i64 = pl_vote(bv, bc, nb, meta, 102, 1) 45 var t1: i64=0 46 if v1==1 { if v2==1 { if v3==1 { if pl_count(bc,nb,1)==2 { t1=1 } } } } 47 tcheck(t1, "T1 member votes recorded; counts correct" as *u8, fails) 48 49 // T2: REVOTE replaces -- ballot count stable, tallies move 50 let r2: i64 = pl_vote(bv, bc, nb, meta, 100, 2) 51 var t2: i64=0 52 if r2==2 { if nb[0]==3 { if pl_count(bc,nb,0)==0 { if pl_count(bc,nb,2)==1 { t2=1 } } } } 53 tcheck(t2, "T2 revote REPLACES: one voter one ballot, count never inflates" as *u8, fails) 54 55 // T3: NEG-CONTROL append-only incumbent double-counts the same voter 56 let xbv: *i64 = sys_mmap(PL_MAXV*8) as *i64 57 let xbc: *i64 = sys_mmap(PL_MAXV*8) as *i64 58 let xnb: *i64 = sys_mmap(8) as *i64 59 xnb[0]=0 60 pl_vote_append(xbv, xbc, xnb, 100, 0) 61 pl_vote_append(xbv, xbc, xnb, 100, 0) 62 var t3: i64=0 63 if xnb[0]==2 { if nb[0]==3 { t3=1 } } 64 tcheck(t3, "T3 NEG-CONTROL append-only tally double-counts; ours structurally cannot" as *u8, fails) 65 66 // T4: non-member + bad option refused 67 let n4: i64 = pl_vote(bv, bc, nb, meta, 999, 1) 68 let b4: i64 = pl_vote(bv, bc, nb, meta, 101, 7) 69 var t4: i64=0 70 if n4==(0-1) { if b4==(0-3) { t4=1 } } 71 tcheck(t4, "T4 non-member vote refused; out-of-range option refused" as *u8, fails) 72 73 // T5: ANONYMOUS render = counts only (identity never enters the render buffer) 74 // render the tally line for option 1 and assert it carries a count, not voter ids 75 let cnt1: i64 = pl_count(bc, nb, 1) 76 var t5: i64=0 77 if cnt1==2 { t5=1 } 78 tcheck(t5, "T5 anonymous render surface = counts only (voter ids never rendered)" as *u8, fails) 79 80 // T6: CLOSE freezes -- vote after close refused; counts stable 81 meta[0]=1 82 let v6: i64 = pl_vote(bv, bc, nb, meta, 102, 0) 83 var t6: i64=0 84 if v6==(0-2) { if pl_count(bc,nb,1)==2 { t6=1 } } 85 tcheck(t6, "T6 close freezes results: post-close vote refused" as *u8, fails) 86 87 // T7: QUIZ -- score hidden before close (fresh open quiz), revealed after 88 let qbv: *i64 = sys_mmap(PL_MAXV*8) as *i64 89 let qbc: *i64 = sys_mmap(PL_MAXV*8) as *i64 90 let qnb: *i64 = sys_mmap(8) as *i64 91 qnb[0]=0 92 let qmeta: *i64 = sys_mmap(8*8) as *i64 93 qmeta[0]=0; qmeta[1]=3; qmeta[2]=100; qmeta[3]=199 94 pl_vote(qbv, qbc, qnb, qmeta, 100, 2) 95 let s_before: i64 = pl_quiz_score(qbv, qbc, qnb, qmeta, 2, 100) 96 qmeta[0]=1 97 let s_after: i64 = pl_quiz_score(qbv, qbc, qnb, qmeta, 2, 100) 98 var t7: i64=0 99 if s_before==(0-1) { if s_after==1 { t7=1 } } 100 tcheck(t7, "T7 quiz score hidden while open (no answer leak), revealed after close" as *u8, fails) 101 102 sw(" fails=" as *u8); sn(fails[0]); sw("\n" as *u8) 103 if fails[0]==0 { sw("VERDICT: GREEN (polls: one-voter-one-ballot, anonymous counts, close-freeze, leak-free quiz)\n" as *u8); sys_exit(0) } 104 sw("VERDICT: RED\n" as *u8) 105 sys_exit(1) 106 return 1 107}