code wiki / _hdl_build / nx_doc_envelope_gate.nx
`nx_doc_envelope_gate.nx` source

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1// nx_doc_envelope_gate.nx -- GATE for LEGAL D2 (nx_doc_envelope).
2//
3// Drives the e-signature ENVELOPE workflow composing D0 (compliance) + D1
4// (vault) + D5 (real Ed25519 seal over the RFC 8032 KAT keypair) and asserts
5// every workflow invariant WITH a negative control:
6//
7//   T1 HAPPY+VAULT  : a contract envelope with 2 ordered signers (+1 CC) sends,
8//                     cannot complete before signing, completes once both have
9//                     a verified seal, and the sealed version lands in the
10//                     additive per-tenant vault.
11//   T2 NEVER-ROUTE-VOID (the s-class crux) : a Last Will & Testament in a
12//                     NON-e-wills jurisdiction -> SEND is REFUSED_VOID and the
13//                     envelope STAYS DRAFT. A generic e-sign clone would send it
14//                     and collect a legally void signature; this one cannot.
15//   T3 ROUTING ORDER: signer 2 cannot sign before signer 1 (OUT_OF_ORDER), then
16//                     in-order both sign and it completes.
17//   T4 TAMPER->NO-COMPLETE : a one-byte-tampered seal is rejected at SIGN
18//                     (BAD_SEAL) so the envelope cannot complete; restoring the
19//                     byte lets it sign + complete (forgery can't finish a deal).
20//   T5 DECLINE ADDITIVE : a decline makes the envelope terminal-DECLINED while
21//                     the audit trail only GROWS and both recipients are retained
22//                     (Rule 13 additive-only).
23//   T6 E-WILL NOT OVER-REFUSED : a properly executed e-will (testator + 2
24//                     witnesses + notary) in an e-wills state sends, signs and
25//                     completes -- we refuse the VOID path, not the valid one.
26//   T7 TENANT ISOLATION : the per-tenant vault prefix discipline rejects
27//                     '.'/'/'/empty tenant ids (no cross-tenant traversal).
28//
29// NOTE (honest): the gate uses the single RFC 8032 KAT keypair for determinism;
30// binding each signer to their OWN key is a provisioning/PKI rung. What is
31// proven here is the WORKFLOW logic + the legal invariants, not multi-key PKI.
32//
33// Evidence -> knowledge/status/doc_envelope.log
34// license_tier: ORIGINAL
35import "nx_doc_envelope.nx"
36import "nx_doc_seal.nx"
37import "nx_doc_vault.nx"
38import "nx_legal_compliance.nx"
39import "nx_syscalls.nx"
40
41const DE_LOG: *u8 = "knowledge/status/doc_envelope.log"
42
43func ew(fd: i64, s: *u8) -> i64 { var n: i64 = 0; while s[n] != (0 as u8) { n = n + 1 } sys_write(fd, s, n); return 0 }
44func ewn(fd: i64, v: i64) -> i64 {
  let bb: *u8 = sys_mmap(28); var m: i64 = v
  if m < 0 { m = 0 - m; sys_write(fd, "-" as *u8, 1) }
  let t: *u8 = sys_mmap(28); var k: i64 = 0
  if m == 0 { t[0] = 48; k = 1 }
  while m > 0 { t[k] = (48 + (m % 10)) as u8; m = m / 10; k = k + 1 }
  var i: i64 = 0; while i < k { bb[i] = t[k - 1 - i]; i = i + 1 }
  sys_write(fd, bb, k); return 0
52}
53func slen(s: *u8) -> i64 { var n: i64 = 0; while s[n] != (0 as u8) { n = n + 1 } return n }
54
55// build + create a real seal in the shared NxSeal buffer; returns create status.
56func mk_seal(s: *NxSeal, dt: i64, ewills: i64, signer: *u8, ts: i64,
           intent: i64, consent: i64, attribution: i64, retainable: i64,
           witnesses: i64, notarized: i64) -> i64 {
  s.doc_type = dt
  s.e_wills_allowed = ewills
  s.intent = intent
  s.consent = consent
  s.attribution = attribution
  s.retainable = retainable
  s.witnesses = witnesses
  s.notarized = notarized
  s.signer_id = signer
  s.signer_id_len = slen(signer)
  s.ts = ts
  return nx_seal_create(s)
71}
72
73func main() -> i64 {
  var ok: i64 = 1
75
  // ---- RFC 8032 test-1 keypair (deterministic) ----
  let priv: *u8 = sys_mmap(64)
  priv[0]=0x9d; priv[1]=0x61; priv[2]=0xb1; priv[3]=0x9d; priv[4]=0xef; priv[5]=0xfd; priv[6]=0x5a; priv[7]=0x60
  priv[8]=0xba; priv[9]=0x84; priv[10]=0x4a; priv[11]=0xf4; priv[12]=0x92; priv[13]=0xec; priv[14]=0x2c; priv[15]=0xc4
  priv[16]=0x44; priv[17]=0x49; priv[18]=0xc5; priv[19]=0x69; priv[20]=0x7b; priv[21]=0x32; priv[22]=0x69; priv[23]=0x19
  priv[24]=0x70; priv[25]=0x3b; priv[26]=0xac; priv[27]=0x03; priv[28]=0x1c; priv[29]=0xae; priv[30]=0x7f; priv[31]=0x60
  let pub: *u8 = sys_mmap(64)
  pub[0]=0xd7; pub[1]=0x5a; pub[2]=0x98; pub[3]=0x01; pub[4]=0x82; pub[5]=0xb1; pub[6]=0x0a; pub[7]=0xb7
  pub[8]=0xd5; pub[9]=0x4b; pub[10]=0xfe; pub[11]=0xd3; pub[12]=0xc9; pub[13]=0x64; pub[14]=0x07; pub[15]=0x3a
  pub[16]=0x0e; pub[17]=0xe1; pub[18]=0x72; pub[19]=0xf3; pub[20]=0xda; pub[21]=0xa6; pub[22]=0x23; pub[23]=0x25
  pub[24]=0xaf; pub[25]=0x02; pub[26]=0x1a; pub[27]=0x68; pub[28]=0xf7; pub[29]=0x07; pub[30]=0x51; pub[31]=0x1a
87
  // ---- shared seal buffers + a synthetic 32-byte document hash ----
  let canon: *u8 = sys_mmap(512)
  let sig: *u8 = sys_mmap(128)
  let dh: *u8 = sys_mmap(64)
  var di: i64 = 0
  while di < 32 { dh[di] = ((di * 7 + 3) & 0xff) as u8; di = di + 1 }
  let s: *NxSeal = sys_mmap(256) as *NxSeal
  s.doc_hash = dh; s.doc_hash_len = 32
  s.priv = priv; s.canon = canon; s.sig = sig
97
  // ---- caller-allocated workflow stores ----
  let ecap: i64 = 16
  let rcap: i64 = 32
  let acap: i64 = 64
  let vcap: i64 = 16
  let eflat: *i64 = sys_mmap(ecap * EF_STRIDE * 8) as *i64
  let rflat: *i64 = sys_mmap(rcap * RF_STRIDE * 8) as *i64
  let aflat: *i64 = sys_mmap(acap * AF_STRIDE * 8) as *i64
  let vflat: *i64 = sys_mmap(vcap * VF_STRIDE * 8) as *i64
  var ne: i64 = 0
  var nr: i64 = 0
  var na: i64 = 0
  var vcount: i64 = 0
111
  let DOCID1: i64 = 7101
113
  // ======== T1: happy path + vault integration ========
  var t1: i64 = 1
  // the contract enters the additive vault as version 1
  vcount = nx_vault_add(vflat, vcount, vcap, DOCID1, 5001, 1024, 1000)
  if vcount != 1 { t1 = 0 }
  ne = nx_env_create(eflat, ne, ecap, 9001, DOCID1, "Services Agreement" as *u8, 1, 1000)
  if ne != 1 { t1 = 0 }
  if nx_env_doctype(eflat, ne, 9001) != DT_CONTRACT { t1 = 0 }
  if nx_env_regime(eflat, ne, 9001) != RG_UETA_GENERAL { t1 = 0 }
  nr = nx_env_add_recipient(rflat, nr, rcap, 9001, 101, ROLE_SIGNER, 1)
  nr = nx_env_add_recipient(rflat, nr, rcap, 9001, 102, ROLE_SIGNER, 2)
  nr = nx_env_add_recipient(rflat, nr, rcap, 9001, 103, ROLE_CC, 3)
  na = nx_env_audit_add(aflat, na, acap, 9001, EV_CREATED, 1, 1000)
  if nx_env_send(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9001) != ENV_SEND_OK { t1 = 0 }
  if nx_env_status(eflat, ne, 9001) != ENV_SENT { t1 = 0 }
  na = nx_env_audit_add(aflat, na, acap, 9001, EV_SENT, 1, 1001)
  // cannot complete before any signature
  if nx_env_try_complete(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9001) != ENV_COMPLETE_NOT_READY { t1 = 0 }
  // signer 1 signs (real VALID contract seal)
  let a1: i64 = mk_seal(s, DT_CONTRACT, 1, "client1@andelinwest.com" as *u8, 1100, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
  if a1 != SEAL_OK { t1 = 0 }
  if nx_env_sign(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9001, 101, s, pub) != ENV_SIGN_OK { t1 = 0 }
  na = nx_env_audit_add(aflat, na, acap, 9001, EV_SIGNED, 101, 1100)
  // still not complete (1 of 2)
  if nx_env_try_complete(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9001) != ENV_COMPLETE_NOT_READY { t1 = 0 }
  // signer 2 signs
  let a2: i64 = mk_seal(s, DT_CONTRACT, 1, "client2@andelinwest.com" as *u8, 1200, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
  if a2 != SEAL_OK { t1 = 0 }
  if nx_env_sign(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9001, 102, s, pub) != ENV_SIGN_OK { t1 = 0 }
  na = nx_env_audit_add(aflat, na, acap, 9001, EV_SIGNED, 102, 1200)
  // now completes
  if nx_env_try_complete(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9001) != ENV_COMPLETE_OK { t1 = 0 }
  if nx_env_status(eflat, ne, 9001) != ENV_COMPLETED { t1 = 0 }
  na = nx_env_audit_add(aflat, na, acap, 9001, EV_COMPLETED, 1, 1300)
  // the completed, sealed version is attached in the additive vault
  if nx_vault_attach_seal(vflat, vcount, DOCID1) != VAULT_OK { t1 = 0 }
  let vc: i64 = nx_vault_current_idx(vflat, vcount, DOCID1)
  if vc < 0 { t1 = 0 }
  if vflat[vc * VF_STRIDE + VF_SEAL] != 1 { t1 = 0 }
  // a full audit trail exists (created/sent/signed/signed/completed)
  if nx_env_audit_count(aflat, na, 9001) != 5 { t1 = 0 }
  if t1 != 1 { ok = 0 }
156
  // ======== T2: NEVER ROUTE A VOID INSTRUMENT (the s-class crux) ========
  var t2: i64 = 1
  ne = nx_env_create(eflat, ne, ecap, 9002, 7102, "Last Will and Testament" as *u8, 0, 2000)
  if nx_env_doctype(eflat, ne, 9002) != DT_WILL { t2 = 0 }
  if nx_env_regime(eflat, ne, 9002) != RG_REQUIRES_WET { t2 = 0 }
  nr = nx_env_add_recipient(rflat, nr, rcap, 9002, 201, ROLE_SIGNER, 1)
  // SEND must refuse and leave the envelope in DRAFT (it never enters e-sign)
  if nx_env_send(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9002) != ENV_SEND_REFUSED_VOID { t2 = 0 }
  if nx_env_status(eflat, ne, 9002) != ENV_DRAFT { t2 = 0 }
  if t2 != 1 { ok = 0 }
167
  // ======== T3: routing order enforced ========
  var t3: i64 = 1
  ne = nx_env_create(eflat, ne, ecap, 9003, 7103, "Partnership Agreement" as *u8, 1, 3000)
  nr = nx_env_add_recipient(rflat, nr, rcap, 9003, 301, ROLE_SIGNER, 1)
  nr = nx_env_add_recipient(rflat, nr, rcap, 9003, 302, ROLE_SIGNER, 2)
  if nx_env_send(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9003) != ENV_SEND_OK { t3 = 0 }
  // signer 2 (order 2) tries first -> OUT_OF_ORDER
  let b2: i64 = mk_seal(s, DT_CONTRACT, 1, "p2@x.com" as *u8, 3200, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
  if nx_env_sign(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9003, 302, s, pub) != ENV_SIGN_OUT_OF_ORDER { t3 = 0 }
  // signer 1 signs -> OK
  let b1: i64 = mk_seal(s, DT_CONTRACT, 1, "p1@x.com" as *u8, 3300, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
  if nx_env_sign(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9003, 301, s, pub) != ENV_SIGN_OK { t3 = 0 }
  // now signer 2 -> OK
  let b3: i64 = mk_seal(s, DT_CONTRACT, 1, "p2@x.com" as *u8, 3400, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
  if nx_env_sign(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9003, 302, s, pub) != ENV_SIGN_OK { t3 = 0 }
  if nx_env_try_complete(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9003) != ENV_COMPLETE_OK { t3 = 0 }
  if t3 != 1 { ok = 0 }
185
  // ======== T4: a tampered seal cannot sign or complete ========
  var t4: i64 = 1
  ne = nx_env_create(eflat, ne, ecap, 9004, 7104, "Engagement Agreement" as *u8, 1, 4000)
  nr = nx_env_add_recipient(rflat, nr, rcap, 9004, 401, ROLE_SIGNER, 1)
  if nx_env_send(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9004) != ENV_SEND_OK { t4 = 0 }
  let c4: i64 = mk_seal(s, DT_CONTRACT, 1, "client@x.com" as *u8, 4100, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
  if c4 != SEAL_OK { t4 = 0 }
  // flip one canonical byte -> the Ed25519 seal no longer verifies
  let cb4: *u8 = s.canon
  cb4[10] = (cb4[10] ^ 0x55) as u8
  if nx_env_sign(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9004, 401, s, pub) != ENV_SIGN_BAD_SEAL { t4 = 0 }
  if nx_env_try_complete(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9004) != ENV_COMPLETE_NOT_READY { t4 = 0 }
  // restore -> signs + completes
  cb4[10] = (cb4[10] ^ 0x55) as u8
  if nx_env_sign(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9004, 401, s, pub) != ENV_SIGN_OK { t4 = 0 }
  if nx_env_try_complete(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9004) != ENV_COMPLETE_OK { t4 = 0 }
  if t4 != 1 { ok = 0 }
203
  // ======== T5: decline is additive (history retained) ========
  var t5: i64 = 1
  ne = nx_env_create(eflat, ne, ecap, 9005, 7105, "Service Agreement" as *u8, 1, 5000)
  nr = nx_env_add_recipient(rflat, nr, rcap, 9005, 501, ROLE_SIGNER, 1)
  nr = nx_env_add_recipient(rflat, nr, rcap, 9005, 502, ROLE_SIGNER, 2)
  if nx_env_send(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9005) != ENV_SEND_OK { t5 = 0 }
  na = nx_env_audit_add(aflat, na, acap, 9005, EV_CREATED, 1, 5000)
  na = nx_env_audit_add(aflat, na, acap, 9005, EV_SENT, 1, 5001)
  na = nx_env_audit_add(aflat, na, acap, 9005, EV_VIEWED, 501, 5002)
  if nx_env_audit_count(aflat, na, 9005) != 3 { t5 = 0 }
  if nx_env_decline(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9005, 501) != 0 { t5 = 0 }
  na = nx_env_audit_add(aflat, na, acap, 9005, EV_DECLINED, 501, 5003)
  if nx_env_status(eflat, ne, 9005) != ENV_DECLINED { t5 = 0 }
  // audit grew (never shrank) and both recipients are retained (not deleted)
  if nx_env_audit_count(aflat, na, 9005) != 4 { t5 = 0 }
  if nx_env_required_signers(rflat, nr, 9005) != 2 { t5 = 0 }
  if t5 != 1 { ok = 0 }
221
  // ======== T6: a proper e-will is NOT over-refused ========
  var t6: i64 = 1
  ne = nx_env_create(eflat, ne, ecap, 9006, 7106, "Last Will and Testament" as *u8, 1, 6000)
  if nx_env_regime(eflat, ne, 9006) != RG_ELECTRONIC_WILLS { t6 = 0 }
  nr = nx_env_add_recipient(rflat, nr, rcap, 9006, 601, ROLE_SIGNER, 1)
  // e-wills jurisdiction -> SEND is allowed (routed to the stricter regime)
  if nx_env_send(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9006) != ENV_SEND_OK { t6 = 0 }
  // properly executed e-will: testator + 2 witnesses + notary -> VALID
  let e6: i64 = mk_seal(s, DT_WILL, 1, "testator@x.com" as *u8, 6100, 1, 0, 1, 1, 2, 1)
  if e6 != SEAL_OK { t6 = 0 }
  if s.regime != RG_ELECTRONIC_WILLS { t6 = 0 }
  if nx_env_sign(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9006, 601, s, pub) != ENV_SIGN_OK { t6 = 0 }
  if nx_env_try_complete(eflat, ne, rflat, nr, 9006) != ENV_COMPLETE_OK { t6 = 0 }
  if t6 != 1 { ok = 0 }
236
  // ======== T7: per-tenant vault prefix discipline (no traversal) ========
  var t7: i64 = 1
  if nx_vault_valid_tid("client_andelinwest" as *u8) != 1 { t7 = 0 }
  if nx_vault_valid_tid("../secret" as *u8) != 0 { t7 = 0 }
  if nx_vault_valid_tid("a/b" as *u8) != 0 { t7 = 0 }
  if nx_vault_valid_tid("" as *u8) != 0 { t7 = 0 }
  if t7 != 1 { ok = 0 }
244
  // ---- evidence ----
  var fd: i64 = 1
  while fd >= 1 {
      ew(fd, "DOCENVELOPEGATE authored=organ composes=D0+D1+D5 happy_complete=" as *u8); ewn(fd, t1)
      ew(fd, " never_route_void=" as *u8); ewn(fd, t2)
      ew(fd, " routing_order=" as *u8); ewn(fd, t3)
      ew(fd, " tamper_no_complete=" as *u8); ewn(fd, t4)
      ew(fd, " decline_additive=" as *u8); ewn(fd, t5)
      ew(fd, " ewill_not_overrefused=" as *u8); ewn(fd, t6)
      ew(fd, " tenant_isolation=" as *u8); ewn(fd, t7)
      if ok == 1 { ew(fd, " verdict=GREEN\n" as *u8) } else { ew(fd, " verdict=RED\n" as *u8) }
      if fd == 1 {
          let lf: i64 = sys_openat_append(DE_LOG, 420)
          if lf >= 1 { fd = lf } else { fd = 0 }
      } else {
          sys_close(fd); fd = 0
      }
  }
263
  if ok == 1 { return 0 }
  return 1
266}
nx_doc_envelope_gate.nx source

`nx_doc_envelope_gate.nx` source
