nx_e2e_gate.nx source

1// nx_e2e_gate.nx -- proves the sovereign E2E session (nx_e2e): private calls the relay can't read. Native, no node. 2// 1) ECDH agreement: Alice and Bob independently derive the SAME session key (the E2E core) 3// 2) seal/open round-trip: Bob decrypts Alice's sealed message exactly 4// 3) RELAY/EAVESDROPPER CAN'T READ (neg): a party without the shared key (the daemon, or Eve) fails to open 5// 4) on-the-wire is ciphertext, not plaintext 6// 5) tamper detection (neg): flipping one ciphertext byte -> open rejects (Poly1305) 7// license_tier: ORIGINAL 8import "nx_syscalls.nx" 9import "nx_gate_emit_lib.nx" 10import "nx_e2e.nx" 11import "nx_gate_verdict.nx" 12 13func beq(a: *u8, b: *u8, n: i64) -> i64 { var i: i64=0; while i<n { if a[i]!=b[i] { return 0 } i=i+1 } return 1 } 14 15func main() -> i64 { 16 g_puts("nx_e2e gate (sovereign end-to-end encryption -- the relay can't read the call)\n" as *u8) 17 var pass: i64 = 0; var total: i64 = 0 18 19 let ap: *u8 = sys_mmap(32); let bp: *u8 = sys_mmap(32); let ep: *u8 = sys_mmap(32) 20 var i: i64 = 0 21 while i < 32 { ap[i] = ((0x11 + i) & 0xff) as u8; bp[i] = ((0x55 + i*3) & 0xff) as u8; ep[i] = ((0x99 + i*7) & 0xff) as u8; i = i + 1 } 22 let apub: *u8 = sys_mmap(32); let bpub: *u8 = sys_mmap(32) 23 e2e_pub(ap, apub) // Alice's public key (shareable / stored in a contact) 24 e2e_pub(bp, bpub) // Bob's public key 25 26 // 1) ECDH agreement: both derive the same session key 27 let akey: *u8 = sys_mmap(32); let bkey: *u8 = sys_mmap(32) 28 e2e_session_key(ap, bpub, akey) // Alice: my_priv x Bob_pub 29 e2e_session_key(bp, apub, bkey) // Bob: my_priv x Alice_pub 30 pass = pass + g_check("ECDH: Alice and Bob derive the SAME session key (E2E core)" as *u8, beq(akey, bkey, 32)); total=total+1 31 32 // 2) seal/open round-trip 33 let nonce: *u8 = sys_mmap(12); i=0; while i<12 { nonce[i] = (1 + i) as u8; i=i+1 } 34 let msg: *u8 = "hello nishi family -- private call" as *u8 35 var mlen: i64 = 0; while msg[mlen] != (0 as u8) { mlen = mlen + 1 } 36 let ct: *u8 = sys_mmap(256); let tag: *u8 = sys_mmap(16); let dec: *u8 = sys_mmap(256) 37 e2e_seal(akey, nonce, msg, mlen, ct, tag) 38 let ok: i64 = e2e_open(bkey, nonce, ct, mlen, tag, dec) 39 pass = pass + g_check("seal/open: Bob decrypts Alice's message exactly" as *u8, (ok == 1) & (beq(dec, msg, mlen) == 1)); total=total+1 40 41 // 3) the RELAY / an eavesdropper (no shared key) cannot read it 42 let ekey: *u8 = sys_mmap(32) 43 e2e_session_key(ep, apub, ekey) // Eve's key (or the server's: it has no participant private key) 44 let dec2: *u8 = sys_mmap(256) 45 let eve: i64 = e2e_open(ekey, nonce, ct, mlen, tag, dec2) 46 pass = pass + g_check("relay/eavesdropper without the key CANNOT open (neg)" as *u8, eve == 0); total=total+1 47 48 // 4) on the wire it's ciphertext, not plaintext 49 pass = pass + g_check("on-the-wire payload is ciphertext, not plaintext" as *u8, beq(ct, msg, mlen) == 0); total=total+1 50 51 // 5) tamper detection 52 ct[0] = (ct[0] ^ 0xff) as u8 53 let dec3: *u8 = sys_mmap(256) 54 let tampered: i64 = e2e_open(bkey, nonce, ct, mlen, tag, dec3) 55 pass = pass + g_check("tamper: a flipped ciphertext byte is rejected (Poly1305, neg)" as *u8, tampered == 0); total=total+1 56 57 g_puts("---- e2e gate: passed " as *u8); g_pn(pass); g_puts(" / " as *u8); g_pn(total); g_puts(" ----\n" as *u8) 58 // MIGRATED onto nx_gate_verdict by nx_gate_dry_apply (D001, minimal form): every check 59 // row above is untouched, so the PASS/FAIL vector cannot change; only the hand-rolled 60 // verdict emission is replaced by the ONE shared base class. Proven by nx_gate_migrate verify. 61 let ctr__dry: *i64 = gv_ctr() 62 ctr__dry[0] = pass 63 ctr__dry[1] = total 64 let rc__dry: i64 = gv_verdict("E2E-GATE" as *u8, ctr__dry, "teeth unchanged; verdict emission migrated onto the shared base class" as *u8) 65 sys_exit(rc__dry) 66 return rc__dry 67}