nx_seg_merkle_gate.nx source

1import "nx_gate_gn.nx" 2// nx_seg_merkle_gate.nx -- exceed-gate for CAP-SEG-MERKLE. Proves proof-of-inclusion: a valid leaf+proof recomputes 3// the root, a wrong leaf is rejected, a single-byte tampered proof is rejected, and both a normal and an odd-tail 4// leaf verify. This is what a bare content-hash CANNOT do: prove membership with O(log n) bytes, no full store read. 5// Sovereign: nx_syscalls + nx_sha256 + nx_seg_merkle. expect_exit: 0 6import "nx_syscalls.nx" 7import "nx_sha256.nx" 8import "nx_seg_merkle.nx" 9import "nx_gate_verdict.nx" 10 11func gp(s: *u8) -> i64 { var n: i64=0; while s[n]!=(0 as u8){n=n+1} sys_write(1,s,n); return 0 } 12 13func main(argc: i64, argv: *i64) -> i64 { 14 gp("=== nx_seg_merkle_gate (proof-of-inclusion: valid=verify, wrong/tamper=reject) ===\n" as *u8) 15 let leaves: *u8 = sys_mmap(5*32) 16 sha256_digest("alpha" as *u8, 5, (leaves as i64 + 0*32) as *u8) 17 sha256_digest("bravo" as *u8, 5, (leaves as i64 + 1*32) as *u8) 18 sha256_digest("charlie" as *u8, 7, (leaves as i64 + 2*32) as *u8) 19 sha256_digest("delta" as *u8, 5, (leaves as i64 + 3*32) as *u8) 20 sha256_digest("echo" as *u8, 4, (leaves as i64 + 4*32) as *u8) 21 let root: *u8 = sys_mmap(32); mk_root(leaves, 5, root) 22 let proof: *u8 = sys_mmap(32*16); let dirs: *i64 = sys_mmap(8*16) as *i64 23 var pass: i64=0; var fail: i64=0 24 25 let depth: i64 = mk_proof(leaves, 5, 2, proof, dirs) 26 if mk_verify((leaves as i64 + 2*32) as *u8, proof, dirs, depth, root) == 1 { pass=pass+1; gp(" T1 leaf 2 inclusion proof (depth " as *u8); gn(depth); gp(") verifies to root PASS\n" as *u8) } else { fail=fail+1; gp(" T1 FAIL\n" as *u8) } 27 28 let wrong: *u8 = sys_mmap(32); sha256_digest("nope" as *u8, 4, wrong) 29 if mk_verify(wrong, proof, dirs, depth, root) == 0 { pass=pass+1; gp(" T2 wrong leaf -> REJECTED PASS\n" as *u8) } else { fail=fail+1; gp(" T2 FAIL wrong accepted\n" as *u8) } 30 31 proof[0] = (proof[0] as i64 ^ 1) as u8 32 if mk_verify((leaves as i64 + 2*32) as *u8, proof, dirs, depth, root) == 0 { pass=pass+1; gp(" T3 single-byte tampered proof -> REJECTED PASS\n" as *u8) } else { fail=fail+1; gp(" T3 FAIL tamper accepted\n" as *u8) } 33 proof[0] = (proof[0] as i64 ^ 1) as u8 34 35 let d0: i64 = mk_proof(leaves, 5, 0, proof, dirs) 36 if mk_verify((leaves as i64 + 0*32) as *u8, proof, dirs, d0, root) == 1 { pass=pass+1; gp(" T4 leaf 0 verifies PASS\n" as *u8) } else { fail=fail+1; gp(" T4 FAIL\n" as *u8) } 37 38 let d4: i64 = mk_proof(leaves, 5, 4, proof, dirs) 39 if mk_verify((leaves as i64 + 4*32) as *u8, proof, dirs, d4, root) == 1 { pass=pass+1; gp(" T5 leaf 4 (odd tail) verifies PASS\n" as *u8) } else { fail=fail+1; gp(" T5 FAIL\n" as *u8) } 40 41 gp("RESULT pass=" as *u8); gn(pass); gp(" fail=" as *u8); gn(fail) 42 // MIGRATED onto nx_gate_verdict by nx_gate_dry_apply (D001, minimal form): every check 43 // row above is untouched, so the PASS/FAIL vector cannot change; only the hand-rolled 44 // verdict emission is replaced by the ONE shared base class. Proven by nx_gate_migrate verify. 45 let ctr__dry: *i64 = gv_ctr() 46 ctr__dry[0] = pass 47 ctr__dry[1] = pass + fail 48 let rc__dry: i64 = gv_verdict("SEG-MERKLE-GATE" as *u8, ctr__dry, "O(log n) verifiable inclusion -- IPLD/CT-class)" as *u8) 49 sys_exit(rc__dry) 50 return rc__dry 51}