nx_anon_transport.nx

nx_anon_transport.nx -- the ANONYMIZING TRANSPORT INTERFACE: the single seam the privacy no-leak guard's nx_private_fetch calls INSTEAD of a raw socket (guard design: knowledge/store/media-inventory/privacy_noleak_guard.DESIGN.txt). A pluggable BACKEND decides HOW the external connection is carried. This is the common foundation every anonymity path (SOCKS5->Tor, native Tor, mixnet) plugs into: the guard codes against anon_* and never against a concrete transport, so the anonymizer can be strengthened underneath it without touching the guard. HONESTY, ENCODED IN CODE: anon_is_anonymizing() returns 1 ONLY for a backend that actually hides the origin from the destination. A bare SOCKS5 proxy does NOT (the proxy sees origin+dest+timing) -- it anonymizes only when it is a Tor client's SOCKS port, which is the ANON_TOR backend (still a roadmap stub, so TODAY every IMPLEMENTED backend returns 0). The guard MUST consult this before any private-category external fetch, so a plain proxy can never be silently mistaken for anonymity. Sovereign: nx_syscalls + nx_socks5_client. No libc, no shell. license_tier: ORIGINAL expect_exit: 0