nx_commons_sybilcost.nx

nx_commons_sybilcost.nx -- what does an attack actually COST? The sybil bound, measured. WHY THIS EXISTS: every layer built today claims sybil resistance, and a claim is not a bound. "The ring collapses because it cannot manufacture witnesses" is an ASSERTION until someone states the quantity an attacker must spend and shows it does not shrink as the attack grows. ★ SYBIL-RESISTANT IS NOT A PROPERTY, IT IS A PRICE. Name the price or you have said nothing. KNOWN GOOD: the trust-flow bound (Advogato's metric; SybilGuard / SybilLimit). Its theorem is the one useful result in this area and it is counter-intuitive enough to be worth stating plainly: an attacker's total influence is bounded by the number of ATTACK EDGES -- honest members who vouch for a sybil -- and is INDEPENDENT of how many sybils the attacker creates. Minting identities is free; being vouched for by someone honest is not. So the cost scales with the only thing the attacker cannot manufacture: other people's genuine regard. NOTE ON SCOPE, because it is the honest half: there is no in-estate known good for proof-of- personhood, and I looked -- nx_realperson is CONTENT SAFETY about real people (NCII, defamation, right of publicity), not "is this account a human". I inferred otherwise from its NAME and was wrong. Nor is there a good global answer: biometric uniqueness centralises and builds a honeypot, government ID excludes the undocumented and is best-held by exactly the class we are excluding. ★ BUT FOR A BOUNDED NEIGHBOUR COMMONS, PERSONHOOD IS THE EASY CASE, NOT THE HARD ONE -- neighbours physically know each other, and the witness layer already built IS the mechanism. This organ does not add a new check; it PRICES the one we have. Integer only. license_tier: ORIGINAL No hw writes (Rule 26).