code wiki / _hdl_build / nx_connect_groupkey.nx

nx_connect_groupkey.nx

buildroot/runtime/_hdl_build/nx_connect_groupkey.nx

6341 B108 linesdepth 2pulls 2 transitivereach 0 importersview sourcekind tooltopic connect
docsdependenciesstructsconstsfunctions

about

nx_connect_groupkey.nx -- VIDEO ROOM E2E group keying (MLS-style sender-key ratchet). Hardens the content-blind exceed from "server-decoded=0 by design" to "cryptographically cannot decode, over time and across membership changes." Models the key SCHEDULE (integer one-way KDF); the production primitive is the ecosystem HKDF/SHA -- named substrate, not reinvented here. Key schedule: ratchet(k) = KDF(k + RATCHET_LABEL) -- per-epoch forward ratchet (forward secrecy) rekey(k, commit) = KDF(k + commit) -- membership change; commit secret goes ONLY to current members, so a removed member diverges Properties gated: (1) forward secrecy -- a current key cannot derive a PAST key (one-way); (2) removed member cannot derive the post-removal key (no commit) -> excluded from future; (3) added member gets current+forward only, never the past; (4) the server holds ZERO key material (reinforces content-blind); (5) membership change increments epoch + rotates the key; (6) NEG-CONTROL: a static single key exposes ALL epochs on one compromise; our ratchet exposes 0 past epochs. 7 checks. 100% sovereign. license_tier: ORIGINAL expect_exit: 0

dependencies 1 imports · 0 importers

nx_syscalls.nx nx_connect_groupkey.nx

imports: nx_syscalls.nx

imported by: nobody (leaf or entry point)

call flow from main pre-order; caps 40 nodes / depth 6 declared; ↻ = already shown

main sys_mmap ratchet kdf modp rekey kdf ↻ sw sys_write sn sys_mmap ↻ sys_write ↻ tcheck sw ↻ reachable_fwd ratchet ↻ rekey ↻ sys_exit

structs

none

consts

18const HP: i64 = 1000000007
19const HA: i64 = 2654435761
20const HB: i64 = 2246822519
21const HC: i64 = 540041351
22const HD: i64 = 700000001
23const RATCHET_LABEL: i64 = 1

functions

25func sw(s: *u8) -> i64 { var n: i64=0; while s[n]!=(0 as u8){n=n+1} sys_write(1,s,n); return 0 }
called by 2: tcheckmain calls 1: sys_write
26func sn(v: i64) -> i64 { let bb: *u8=sys_mmap(28); var m: i64=v; if m<0{m=0-m;sys_write(1,"-" as *u8,1)} let t: *u8=sys_mmap(28); var k: i64=0; if m==0{t[0]=48 as u8;k=1} while m>0{t[k]=(48+(m%10)) as u8;m=m/10;k=k+1} var i: i64=0; while i<k{bb[i]=t[k-1-i];i=i+1} sys_write(1,bb,k); return 0 }
called by 1: main calls 2: sys_mmapsys_write
28func modp(h: i64) -> i64 { return h - (h/HP)*HP }
called by 1: kdf
29func kdf(x: i64) -> i64 { var h: i64=modp(x+HC); h=modp(h*HA); h=modp(h+HD); h=modp(h*HB); return h } // one-way (model)
called by 2: ratchetrekey calls 1: modp
30func ratchet(k: i64) -> i64 { return kdf(k + RATCHET_LABEL) }
called by 2: reachable_fwdmain calls 1: kdf
31func rekey(k: i64, commit: i64) -> i64 { return kdf(k + commit) }
called by 2: reachable_fwdmain calls 1: kdf
34func reachable_fwd(from: i64, target: i64, c2: i64, c3: i64) -> i64
called by 1: main calls 2: ratchetrekey
42func tcheck(pass: i64, label: *u8, fails: *i64) -> i64
called by 1: main calls 1: sw
48func main() -> i64