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nx_doc_crypto.nx

buildroot/runtime/_hdl_build/nx_doc_crypto.nx

9031 B179 linesdepth 6pulls 10 transitivereach 14 importersview sourcekind librarytopic doc

docs dependencies structs consts functions

about

nx_doc_crypto.nx -- ENCRYPTION-AT-REST core for CONFIDENTIAL docportal shards (client -prv-/-secret-/uploads; NOT the public corpus). Envelope encryption (NIST SP 800-57): a master KEK wraps per-tenant DEKs; documents are sealed with the DEK under a REAL AEAD. Grounds ENTIRELY in shipped, KAT-proven sovereign primitives -- invents NO crypto: AEAD = ChaCha20-Poly1305 (RFC 8439 2.8; nx_chacha20_poly1305, KAT-verified vs the 2.8.2 Sunscreen vector) cipher = ChaCha20 (256-bit key) ; MAC = Poly1305 (constant-time compare) CSPRNG = nx_csprng_fill (getrandom(2), /dev/urandom fallback) CRYPTO-SHRED reconciles Rule 13 (never-delete DATA) with GDPR Art 17 (erasure): the DATA store stays additive (ciphertext history preserved), but the KEY store is the ONE place true deletion is correct -- destroying the wrapped DEK erases ACCESS while the ciphertext bytes remain, permanently unrecoverable. So DEKs live in a per-domain FILE (overwrite-with-random + truncate + unlink), NOT the additive seg-store, precisely because the seg-store's never-delete law is wrong for a key that must be destroyable. STANDALONE lib -- wires into no daemon. HONEST LIMITATION: the KEK is a software file (0600) on the NAS, not an HSM/TPM -- root or a disk image can read it (flag for the operator). license_tier: ORIGINAL

dependencies 3 imports · 2 importers

imports: nx_chacha20_poly1305.nxnx_csprng.nxnx_syscalls.nx

imported by: nx_doc_at_rest.nxnx_doc_crypto_gate.nx

structs

none

consts

21	const DC_WRAP_BYTES: i64 = 60 // wrapped DEK = nonce(12) \|\| ct(32) \|\| tag(16)
22	const DC_MODE_0600: i64 = 0x180 // rw------- : DEK + KEK files are owner-only

functions

24	func dc_slen(s: *u8) -> i64 { var n: i64 = 0; while s[n] != (0 as u8) { n = n + 1 } return n } called by 4: dek_gen dek_load doc_encrypt doc_decrypt
25	func dc_cat(out: u8, o: i64, s: u8) -> i64 { var i: i64 = 0; while s[i] != (0 as u8) { out[o] = s[i]; o = o + 1; i = i + 1 } return o } called by 1: dc_dek_path
27	func dc_dek_path(domain: u8, out: u8) -> i64 called by 3: dek_gen dek_load crypto_shred calls 1: dc_cat
35	func dc_readfile(path: u8, buf: u8, cap: i64) -> i64 called by 1: dek_load calls 3: sys_openat_rd sys_read sys_close
50	func dc_writefile(path: u8, buf: u8, n: i64, mode: i64) -> i64 called by 2: kek_ensure dek_gen calls 4: sys_openat_wr sys_write sys_close sys_fsync
69	func kek_ensure(out32: *u8) -> i64 called by 2: dek_gen dek_load calls 5: sys_openat_rd sys_read sys_close nx_csprng_fill dc_writefile
92	func dek_gen(domain: *u8) -> i64 called by 2: dek_ensure main calls 7: sys_mmap kek_ensure nx_csprng_fill nx_chacha20_poly1305_encrypt dc_slen dc_dek_path+1
111	func dek_load(domain: u8, out32: u8) -> i64 called by 4: dek_ensure doc_encrypt doc_decrypt crypto_shred calls 6: sys_mmap dc_dek_path dc_readfile kek_ensure nx_chacha20_poly1305_decrypt dc_slen
125	func doc_encrypt(domain: u8, pt: u8, ptlen: i64, out: *u8) -> i64 called by 2: doc_put main calls 5: sys_mmap dek_load nx_csprng_fill nx_chacha20_poly1305_encrypt dc_slen
138	func doc_decrypt(domain: u8, ct: u8, ctlen: i64, out: *u8) -> i64 called by 2: doc_get main calls 4: sys_mmap dek_load nx_chacha20_poly1305_decrypt dc_slen
151	func crypto_shred(domain: *u8) -> i64 called by 2: main main calls 10: sys_mmap dc_dek_path sys_openat_rdwr nx_csprng_fill sys_lseek sys_write+4