nx_ed25519_extvec_gate.nx

nx_ed25519_extvec_gate.nx -- SECOND provably third-party-validated claim: Ed25519 vs RFC 8032 7.1. Same construction as nx_x25519_extvec_gate, applied to a different authority to prove the pattern GENERALISES rather than being a one-off: 1 no expected value appears in this source -- the public key, message and signature are read at run time out of knowledge/extvec/rfc8032.txt; 2 that file is PINNED to the sha256 nx_vecfetch computed IN-PROCESS at the socket, before the bytes touched disk (e3705131.., independently confirmed by GNU coreutils sha256sum); 3 only then does ed25519_verify_full() run against the document's own signature. ★The pin is the security property. Parsing from a file is necessary but not sufficient -- an edited file would let us grade ourselves against answers of our own choosing. Pinning to an ACQUISITION-time digest is what makes it evidence. SCOPE STATED HONESTLY: this proves our Ed25519 VERIFIER accepts the IETF's own signature over the IETF's own message under the IETF's own public key. It does NOT prove our SIGNER produces those bytes -- that is a separate claim needing the secret-key vector, and it is deliberately not asserted here. license_tier: ORIGINAL expect_exit: 0