nx_extllm_call.nx

nx_extllm_call.nx -- RUNG XL3: the ONLY door through which estate bytes may reach an external model. Every conjunct is checked BEFORE a socket is opened, and each refusal names the rule that fired. 1 TERMS xl_use_verdict on the pinned provider ledger. UNKNOWN refuses. An unpinned row admits nothing. 2 CLASSIFY every prompt byte must come from a file the operator DECLARED public, and whose sha256 still matches that declaration. C by default; a stale hash admits nothing. 3 KEY read from a FILE, never argv -- argv is visible in /proc and in every transcript. 4 CALL our own TLS 1.3 + Mozilla trust store, the same send/recv core the InnerTube POST path uses. 5 LEDGER one appended row per call, so "how much has provider P seen, in total, across all time?" is a read and not an investigation. This is the half a per-call check structurally cannot do. The request sets provider.data_collection=deny and zdr=true, which the router documents as a per-request switch -- belt and braces beside the terms row, never instead of it. license_tier: ORIGINAL No hw writes (Rule 26). exit 0 ALLOW / 1 REFUSE / 3 UNKNOWN / 2 usage / 4 transport