nx_hops_probe.nx
buildroot/runtime/nx_hops_probe.nx
about
nx_hops_probe.nx -- PROVE THE REDIRECT-DEPTH OBSERVABLE FIRES.
nx_https_last_hops() was added 2026-08-16 because the fetcher walked the redirect chain and threw
its length away, so nothing downstream could tell a page that DELIVERED from one that BOUNCED.
But an observable that has only ever been read on a NON-redirecting host reads 0, and 0 is exactly
what a broken wire also reads. A green that never had a corresponding red is unverified.
So this is a two-sided control, run against a caller-supplied url:
a direct host -> hops should be 0 (negative control: the counter is not stuck high)
a redirecting host -> hops should be >0 (positive control: the counter actually moves)
Point it at our OWN edge for the redirect case -- it issues 301s for clean urls -- so proving our
instrument costs no third party a single request.
Reports NUMBERS, never a verdict: an uncalibrated observable that emits a judgement teaches people
to trust a bar nobody measured. license_tier: ORIGINAL
dependencies 5 imports · 0 importers
imports: nx_syscalls.nxnx_x509_trust_store.nxnx_trust_store_load_from_certdata.nxnx_https_fetch_follow.nxnx_edgar_lib.nx
imported by: nobody (leaf or entry point)
call flow from main pre-order; caps 40 nodes / depth 6 declared; ↻ = already shown
structs
| none |
consts
| 22 | const HP_CAP: i64 = 4194304 |
| 23 | const HP_TRUST: i64 = 4194304 |
| 24 | const HP_HOPS: i64 = 6 // same bound the shipped callers pass; not a new number |
functions
| 26 | func hp(s: *u8) -> i64 { var n: i64 = 0; while s[n] != (0 as u8) { n = n + 1 } sys_write(1, s, n); return 0 } |
| 27 | func hn(v: i64) -> i64 |
| 39 | func main(argc: i64, argv: *i64) -> i64 |