code wiki / (root) / nx_supply_risk.nx

nx_supply_risk.nx

buildroot/runtime/nx_supply_risk.nx

10351 B269 linesdepth 2pulls 2 transitivereach 1 importersview sourcekind library
docsdependenciesstructsconstsfunctions

about

nx_supply_risk.nx -- GTM SUITE / MANUFACTURING SOURCING + APPROVAL RISK rung. Where to make the material, what importing your own rigor actually costs, and what any of it does to the odds of approval. THE CENTRAL QUESTION THIS ANSWERS: can you buy a cheap manufacturing base and supply the discipline yourself? Largely YES -- GMP is INSPECTION-based, not nationality-based. A facility in Hyderabad holding an EU-GMP certificate and a clean FDA inspection record is legally equivalent to one in Basel, and roughly half of US generic supply already comes from India. Quality Agreements, vendor qualification, person-in-plant and independent lot release are precisely the mechanism for importing rigor, and large sponsors do it every day. BUT THE RIGOR IS NOT FREE, AND THAT IS THE WHOLE FINDING. Model the true cost -- sticker + audit burden + the expected cost of an inspection-driven delay -- and the cheap options CONVERGE. On a $10M API spend the effective costs of India, Poland and China land within a few percent of one another, because the sticker advantage of the cheapest is eaten by its risk premium. Once that is visible, the right basis for choosing is quality of access and regulatory adjacency, NOT the quoted price. Choosing on sticker alone is choosing the risk without pricing it. AN IRONY WORTH NAMING. The dominant failure mode at low-cost sites is DATA INTEGRITY -- falsified or selectively reported records, the Ranbaxy 2013 felony plea being the canonical case. That is the SAME failure mode as the opioid scandal, in a different jurisdiction and a different direction. Fleeing one does not escape the class; only auditing does. ON APPROVAL RISK. FDA does not reject drugs for being foreign -- most new approvals involve foreign data and foreign manufacture. What it does reject is (a) a dataset drawn from a single non-representative population, and (b) a facility that fails inspection. Both are manageable and both are under sponsor control, which is why they are modelled here as inputs rather than as fate. Costs in THOUSANDS of USD; probabilities in per-mil. Grounding (cited; researcher-groundable): fda_foreign_facility_inspection_and_oai_classification ich_q7_gmp_active_pharmaceutical_ingredients

dependencies 1 imports · 1 importers

nx_syscalls.nx nx_supply_risk.nx nx_gtm_svc.nx

imports: nx_syscalls.nx

imported by: nx_gtm_svc.nx

structs

none

consts

48const SR_MAGIC_1100: i64 = 1100
52const SR_SWITZERLAND: i64 = 0
53const SR_US: i64 = 1
54const SR_IRELAND: i64 = 2
55const SR_KOREA: i64 = 3
56const SR_POLAND: i64 = 4
57const SR_INDIA: i64 = 5
58const SR_CHINA: i64 = 6
59const SR_N: i64 = 7
61const SR_INVALID: i64 = 0 - 1
126const SR_DELAY_COST_K: i64 = 18000
234const SR_APPROVAL_OK: i64 = 1
235const SR_RISK_SINGLE_POPULATION: i64 = 2
236const SR_RISK_FACILITY_INSPECTION: i64 = 3

functions

63func sr_name(s: i64) -> *u8
74func sr_valid(s: i64) -> i64
83func sr_cost_permil(s: i64) -> i64
called by 1: sr_sticker_cost_k
101func sr_audit_burden_k(s: i64) -> i64
114func sr_inspection_fail_permil(s: i64) -> i64
128func sr_expected_delay_cost_k(s: i64) -> i64
136func sr_eu_gmp_available(s: i64) -> i64
called by 1: gtm_supply_effective calls 1: sr_valid
146func sr_sticker_cost_k(s: i64, spend_k: i64) -> i64
153func sr_effective_cost_k(s: i64, spend_k: i64) -> i64
165func sr_saving_retained_permil(s: i64, spend_k: i64) -> i64
179func sr_best_effective(spend_k: i64) -> i64
196func sr_best_sticker(spend_k: i64) -> i64
213func sr_low_cost_converged(spend_k: i64, tol_permil: i64) -> i64
242func sr_data_applicability_risk(multiregional: i64, n_regions: i64) -> i64
called by 1: sr_approval_blocker
250func sr_approval_blocker(multiregional: i64, n_regions: i64, site: i64) -> i64
260func sr_foreign_origin_is_a_barrier() -> i64
267func sr_capture_bias_favours_approval() -> i64