code wiki / _hdl_build / nx_trust_corroborate.nx
nx_trust_corroborate.nx
buildroot/runtime/_hdl_build/nx_trust_corroborate.nx
about
nx_trust_corroborate.nx -- the SPORE's sovereign trust bootstrap (operator 2026-06-05: "how do we build from
the hardware layer up so the spore can get this -- thats the approach vs shortcuts or hacks"). A sovereign
system cannot derive trust from nothing, but it must NOT trust a downloaded blob (certdata.txt) or the
substrate's store. The spore carries a RULE, not a trusted file: a root CA is admitted ONLY IF >= K
INDEPENDENT sources present the EXACT SAME bytes -- verified by the team's OWN SHA-256, never a source's
self-claimed hash. This is the team's own >=2-source research-corroboration gate applied to trust anchors:
trust EMERGES from independent agreement, hardware-up. A single tampered/poisoned source cannot reach K alone.
After bootstrap the spore self-updates over its OWN now-trusted HTTPS. license_tier: ORIGINAL
dependencies 2 imports · 2 importers
imports: nx_sha256.nxnx_syscalls.nx
imported by: nx_trust_corroborate_test.nxnx_trust_store_corroborated.nx
structs
| none |
consts
| 12 | const TC_HASHLEN: i64 = 32 |
functions
| 15 | func tc_fingerprint(der: *u8, n: i64, out32: *u8) -> i64 { return sha256_digest(der, n, out32) } |
| 18 | func tc_hash_eq(a: *u8, b: *u8) -> i64 called by 1: tc_agreement_count |
| 26 | func tc_agreement_count(target_fp: *u8, source_fps: *u8, n_sources: i64) -> i64 |
| 37 | func tc_admit(agreement: i64, k: i64) -> i64 |
| 46 | func tc_admit_root(sources: *u8, der_stride: i64, der_len: i64, n_sources: i64, k: i64) -> i64 |
| 59 | func tc_corroboration_strength(sources: *u8, der_stride: i64, der_len: i64, n_sources: i64) -> i64 |